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I INTRODUCTION 
The 1955 Adoption Act was intended to operate as a statutory guillotine, cutting 
forever the ties between birth parents and their children, allowing each party to 
continue on with their lives as if the other never existed. 
Unfortunately, confusion surrounding the consent procedure set out under the 
Adoption Act has resulted in much uncertainty as to when exactly the blade falls 
to forever sever the legal relationship between parent and child, and has led to 
numerous challenges in the Courts to the validity of certain consents to adoption. 
This paper aims to review the historical and current procedures for giving, 
withdrawing, and dispensing with consent and suggest options for reform of 
these procedures. The writer has focussed on a stranger adoption scenario when 
examining the law and formulating proposals because of the belief that adoption 
should not be encouraged in situations involving stepparents and children in care. 
The writer feels that these situations should be dealt with through alternative 
means (such as guardianship and custody) wherever possible and that resort to 
adoption should only be allowed to protect the health and safety of the child or to 
promote the child's interests and security in a way that no other method of care 
would do satisfactorily. 
Part II briefly examines the consent provisions that existed in the New Zealand 
statutes prior to the 1955 Adoption Act and Part III outlines the provisions under 
that Act. 
Part IV undertakes a discussion of the current consent regime, including 
highlighting some of the concerns that have been expressed about this area of 
adoption law and practice. 
Suggestions for reform are outlined in Part V and summarised in Part VI. Part 
VII consists of some concluding remarks. 
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II ADOPTION: 1881-1955 
A Who Could Consent? 
1 Parental consents 
Before an adoption order could be made, the requisite consents had to be filed in 
Court. The exact consents required depended on the status of the potential 
adoptee. 
(a) Orphan or deserted child 
The 1881 Adoption of Children Act did not require consents to be given for a 
deserted child. 1 However, in the case of an orphaned child, the applicants were 
required to petition the Supreme Court to appoint a guardian to give consent to 
the proposed adoption order.2 
With the passing of the Statutes Amendment Act 1943, the Superintendent of 
Child Welfare was given the power to consent to the adoption of orphaned 
children, and consequently applicants no longer needed to petition the Court .3 
(b) Illegitimate child 
The consent of the birth mother of a child born out of wedlock was required in all 
circumstances (unless she had died or deserted the child). 
From 1881-1947 there was some debate as to whether the consent of a birth (or 
putative) father was required for the adoption of an illegitimate child. 
Kettle SM in In re AB 4 held that when there was no proof of desertion the 
consent of the father was to be obtained,5 however in 1942 it was argued that the 
1 Section 3. 
2 ln re Nash (1884) 2 NZLR 286 (SC). 
3 Section 17(2) . 
4 In the matter of an application for an order of adoption of A.B, an illegitimate child ( 1909) 
4MCR 154. 
5 ln the matter of an application for an order of adoption of A.B, an illegitimate child, sec above 
114 , 155 . 
5 
putative father was not a 'parent' within the meaning of the Infants Act 1908 and 
hence his consent was not required.6 
Legislative action brought the debate to a halt by declaring in section 26 of the 
Statutes Amendment Act 1947 that the description of 'parents' in the case of an 
illegitimate child did not include the natural father. Therefore, his consent was 
not required (but could be obtained if it was expedient to do so). 
(c) Legitimate child 
Consent was required from both birth parents of a legitimate child in order for 
that child to be adopted. If one parent was dead, then the consent of the living 
parent and that of any guardian appointed by the deceased parent was required.7 
No consent was required from a parent who had deserted the child. 8 
From 1951 the Court had the power to dispense with the consent of parents in 
certain situations (see Part II D) provided that the Superintendent of Child 
Welfare consented to the proposed order. 9 
(d) Adopted child 
When a child had already been adopted but a new adoption order was proposed 
the consent of the birth parents was required to make the new order effective.10 
This was because the previous adoption order was discharged and the child was 
deemed to have the same status as he or she did before the order was made (that 
is , he or she was once again deemed to be the legal child of the birth parents). 11 
Therefore the birthparents were required to consent to the placement of their 
child with new adoptive parents. 
6 "Adoption of the Illegitimate Child: is Consent of the Putative Father Necessary? " ( 1942) 18 
NZLJ 164. 
7 Adoption of Children Act 1881 s3 ; Adoption of Children Act 1895 s5(5); Infants Act 1908 
sl8(1)(e). 
8 Adoption of Children Act 1881 s3; Adoption of Children Act 1895 s5(6); Infants Act 1908 
s 18( I )(f). 
9 Statutes Amendment Act 1951 sl5(1). 
10 This view was expounded in In re an Adoption ( 1945) 4 MCD 481. 
11 Infants Act 1908 s22(2). 
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2 Non-parental consents 
The consent of a child over 12 was also required in all situations prior to I 942. 12 
Post 1942 the Court could dispense with the child's consent if it was not 
desirable to require it in the circumstances of the case. 13 
When the Superintendent of Child Welfare became a guardian of a child by 
virtue of section 16 of the Child Welfare Act 1925, his or her consent was 
required for an order to be made for a child in his or her care. 
B Manner of Consents 
The Adoption Regulations produced in 1882 provided for the consent of a birth 
parent to an adoption to be given by way of a written affidavit. There was no 
prescribed form. 14 
However, the Regulations accompanying the Adoption of Children Act 1895 
required the consent to be given on Form No5 and 'signed, attested and filed.' 15 
The consent had to be witnessed by a Judge, Justice of the Peace, Clerk of the 
Court, Registrar or Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court before it was valid. 16 
Later, the 1908 Infants Act Regulations of 1912 specified two forms of consent -
one to be used by the parents of the proposed adoptee (Form No5) and one (Form 
No6) to be completed by the guardian (in place of parental consent). 17 A 
Stipendiary Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, and Clerk of the Court or a solicitor 
could witness these forms. 18 
12 Adoption of Children Act 1895 s5(4); Infants Act 1908 sl8(d). 
13 Statutes Amendment Act 1942 s15. 
l.J Adoption of Children Regulations 1882, Regulation 5. 
15 Adoption of Children Act Regulations 1895, Regulation 9. 
16 Adoption of Children Act Regulations 1895, Regulation 9. 
17 Infants Act Regulations 1912, Regulation 5. 
18 Infants Act Regulations 1912, Regulation 5. 
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C Consent Withdrawal 
Up until 1955 Birth parents had an absolute right to withdraw their consent to the 
adoption at any time before the written order was signed. 19 This could create a 
climate of intense uncertainty in the period between the giving of the consent and 
the signing of the adoption order, as the birth parent could suddenly withdraw 
consent on a whim and throw the whole arrangement into turmoil. 
D Dispensing with Consent 
Prior to 1907 the requisite consents to an adoption could only be dispensed with 
in the case of a deserted child. 
In 1907 the Infant Life Protection Act provided that the Court could make an 
adoption order without the consent of the parent or guardian if that parent or 
guardian was "unfit to have the custody or control of the child" .20 
Much later, in 1951, extra criteria were added - so now the Court could di spense 
with consent if the parents were dead, unknown, missing or of unsound mind 
(and the child had no living legal guardian who was of sound mind).21 
III ADOPTION: 1955-
A Who Can Consent? 
As with the previous statutory regimes certain consents are required to be filed in 
the Court in order for a legal adoption to take place. 
1 Parental consents 
The status of the potential adoptee is again important. 
19 Viggars v Smylie [ l 949] NZLR 906, 907 (SC) . 
20 Infant Life Protection Act 1907 s2 l ( I ). 
2 1 Statutes Amendment Act 1951 s lS(l )( i). 
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(a) Orphan or deserted child 
Under the 1955 Adoption Act the consent regime is designed to protect parental 
rights . No consent is required for an orphan child as there are no such parental 
rights in existence. The same reasoning is applied to justify the lack of consents 
required for the adoption of a deserted child. 
(b) Illegitimate child 
Again , as with the previous regime the consent of the birth mother is required , 
but the birth father ' s consent is not (unless he is a guardian of the child), and will 
only be obtained if it is expedient to do so.22 
(c) Legitimate child 
If the parents were married to each other at the time of the child ' s birth or 
conception , then the consent of both parents (or the testamentary guardian 
appointed by a deceased parent) is required. 23 
It is to be noted that the Status of Children Act 1969 removed the use of the label 
' illegitimate ' when referring to an ex-nuptial child, as well as the label 
'legitimate' when referring to a child of a lawful marriage.24 The titles are 
retained here only for the purpose of comparison with the earlier New Zealand 
adoption statutes. 
(d) Adopted child 
As the child is seen to be the legal child of the adoptive parents , the consents of 
the adoptive parents (or surviving adoptive parent and/or the guardian appointed 
by a deceased adoptive parent) are required before another adoption order can be 
made in favour of another couple. 25 
In contrast to the earlier practice, the birth parents still have no legal links with 
their chi ld - even when the original adoption order is discharged. 
22 Adoption Act 1955 s7(3)(b). 
23 Adoption Act 1955 s7(3)(a). 
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2 Non-parental consents 
Consent of the proposed adoptee was no longer required, but instead their wishes 
were to be taken account of under section 11 (b) of the Adoption Act 1955. The 
varying levels of children's maturity and their differing ability to make sensible 
decisions in their best interests appear to have been paramount considerations in 
the dropping of the requirement for the adoptee's consent. 26 
The consent of the Director-General is required only when he or she has been 
appointed as substitute consenter by virtue of section 7(4) of the Adoption Act 
1955. Except in this situation, consent is not required from the Director-General 
for children in his or her care. 
B Manner of Consents 
Under the 1955 Adoption Act regulations, parental consent is to be given on 
prescribed forms (either Form No2 or Form No3). 
Form No2 is used when the birth parents know the names of the applicants for 
adoption. Form No3 is used when the parents are consenting to adoption by an 
'approved person' or by reference to an application number rather that the 
applicants' names. When using Form No3 the parent may state any religious 
qualifications attaching to the consent (this requirement is not needed when using 
Form No2 as it is presumed that the particular named persons will have already 
met any religious conditions expressed by the consenting birth parent. ) 
Consents must be specific and on the correct form - a parent cannot sign a 
general consent to adoption, except by way of appointing the Director-General as 
guardian to give consent under section 7(4). 27 
Witnesses to the consents are specified in section 7 (8) of the Adoption Act 1955 
- Solicitor,28 District or Family Court Judge, Registrar of the District or High 
24 Status of Children Act 1969 s 12(2). 
25 Adoption Act 1955 s7(3)(c). 
26 Patricia M Webb A Review of th e Law on Adoption 27 January 1979, 44 (Webb Report). 27 Keith C Griffith New Zealand Adoption: History and Practice, Social and Legal 1840-1996 
November 1997, 54 (Griffith New Zealand Adoption). 
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Court or a Judge or Commissioner or Registrar of the Maori Land Court. There 
are other provisions for the taking of consent outside New Zealand. 
The witness must explain the legal effects of the adoption order to the birth 
parent, sign a declaration of this and of the fact that they believe the birth parent 
has fully understood such effects. 29 
C Timing of Consents 
The 1955 Act provides that a document signifying consent by a mother of a child 
to an adoption (of that child) shall not be admissible unless the child is at least 10 
days old at the date of execution of the document.30 In practice this means that 
there are 10 clear days left between the birth of the child and the execution of the 
consent form. 31 This time period must also pass before the birth mother can 
legally appoint the Director-General as a guardian and substitute consenter to the 
adoption. 
The 10-day restriction applies only to the mother of the child. Other consents to 
the adoption may be taken at any time after the birth of the child. 
D Consent Withdrawal 
The need for greater certainty in this area was purportedly achieved by section 9 
of the Adoption Act 1955. It is stated in this section that once given, consent 
cannot be withdrawn whilst an application for adoption was pending. 
E Dispensing with Consent 
The Adoption Act 1955 contains much broader provisions dealing with 
dispensing of consent. The chief provisions are: 
28 Note that it has been held , that depite common qualifications , this reference to sol icitor in the 
Act is not wide enough to cover a barrister sole: H v S, unreported, Thames Family Court, 4 Jul y 
1996, Judge Brown. 
29 Adoption Act l955 s7(9). 
30 Adoption Act 1955 s7(7). 
31 Whether the 10-day period included the date of the child's birth was finally decided in Re 
Adoption AP 148/87 ( 1987) 3 FRNZ 450 (HC). 
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s8( 1 )(a) If the Court is satisfied that the parent or guardian has abandoned , neglec ted , 
persistently failed Lo maintain, or persistently ill-treated the child, or failed to exercise 
the normal duty and care of parenthood in respect of the child; and that reasonable 
notice of the application for an adoption order has been given to the parent or guardian 
where the parent or guardian can be found: 
s8(1 )(b) If the Court is satisfied that the parent or guardian is unfit, by reason of any 
physical or mental incapacity , to have the care and control of the child: that the unfitness 
is likely to continue indefinitely; and that reasonable notice of the application for an 
adoption order has been given to the parent or guardian: 
Once one of the grounds for dispensing with consent has been established the 
Court still retains a residual discretion to decide whether or not to in fact 
dispense with consent. This decision must be made in accordance with the 
welfare and interests of the child. 32 
IV DISCUSSION OF PRESENT REGIME 
A Who Can Consent? 
Despite the consent mechanism being virtually the only protection of the birth 
family's rights to maintain links with the proposed adoptee, the range of consents 
required is comparatively limited. 
The birth mother's consent is almost always required (unless it is dispensed with 
by the Court) - this is because it is presumed that the woman who gave birth to 
the child will have strong physical and emotional bonds with the child that 
should not be severed against her wishes. 
The birth father's consent is required where he was married to the mother, was 
the child's guardian or it is 'expedient' to obtain his consent. What will satisfy 
the test of expediency has been somewhat unclear but it will generally be 
required if: 33 
a) The father and mother were living together when the child was born; or 
32 DCSW v L [ 1989] 2 NZLR 314, 322 (CA). 
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b) The father has applied to the Court for a guardianship order; or 
c) A paternity or maintenance order has been made in respect of the child in 
the District of Family Court, or a declaration of paternity made in the 
High Court; 
d) The father has contributed towards the maintenance of the child; or 
e) The father has indicated that he wants to accept full responsibility for his 
paternity and be involved in the child's upbringing. 
Criticisms have been made about the lack of birth family/whanau involvement in 
the adoption process. 34 Family members are not required to consent to the 
adoption (and will often not have standing to oppose it) - even though it will 
permanently sever their links with the child. 
New Zealand law is also notable for its lack of provision for the consent of the 
proposed adoptee - despite the fact that they may be of sufficient maturity as to 
be capable of making such important decisions about their own lives. 
B Manner of Consents 
Criticisms can be made about the current regime for the giving of formal 
consents to adoption. These criticisms relate primarily to the imposition of a 
religious condition, the role of witnesses to the consent and the form in which 
consent is given. 
1 Religious condition 
In regard to the ability of consents to be made conditional subject to the 
requirements of religious denominations or practices of the applicants it has been 
pointed out that it is illogical to select one such aspect of personal life and give it 
33 Robert Ludbrook (cd) Trapski's Family Law Volume 5 (Brooker's, Wellington , 1995) para E9 
· (updated 28 May 1999), (Trapski). 
34 Trapski, see above n33 , para El (updated 20 November 1998). 
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special weight in legislation. 35 Why is religious denomination more important 
than cultural heritage (or other such factors), which cannot be imposed as 
conditions on the consent? 
The effect of this condition is to limit the pool of potential adoptive parents to 
those who profess to comply with the religious practice specified, and often the 
condition would not be able to be fulfilled in selecting adoptive parents. 
Moreover, the effective enforcement of such a condition after the adoption order 
has been made is doubtful. No doubt time and resources are more efficiently 
employed elsewhere. 
2 Role of witnesses 
As to the role of the specified witnesses in the process there are two pertinent 
criticisms to be made of the current regime. 
Firstly, the witnesses need only explain the legal effects of the adoption order -
they are not required (nor are those in the current categories of witnesses perhaps 
qualified) to explain some of the documented emotional and psychological 
effects of the adoption order and the lifelong implications it has for all those 
involved. 
There are no statutory requirements as to the provision of counselling to ensure 
that the birthparent is certain of his or her feelings and decisions and fully 
understands all the effects of signing the consent (not just the legal effects). 
Secondly, it has been argued that there is uncertainty as to what kind of 
relationship is created between a birthparent and a solicitor who witnesses his or 
her consent. 36 
Does a solicitor and client relationship arise or is taking the consent merely an 
administrative act? Does the solicitor have a duty to act in the birthparent's best 
interest or are they acting as an agent for the proposed adoptive parents? 
35 Review of Adoption Act 1955 by an Interdepartmental Working Party: Proposals for discussion 
January 1987 , para 4.36 (Working Party Report). 
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Judge Inglis QC in In the matter of A (adoption)37 expressed the view that the 
solicitor was simply carrying out a statutory function 38 and that he held that 
consent document on behalf of the intending adoptive parents .39 The view of the 
relationship created has implications for determining when consent is given and 
whether it can be withdrawn (see Part IV D 1 below). There are conflicts in the 
current decisions on the matter and the position remains unclear. 40 
3 Forms of consent 
The prescribed forms of consent contain only limited information as to the legal 
effects of the adoption. No information is provided about whether the consent 
can be withdrawn or how this might be done. Consequently, birth parents who 
sign a consent document may nevertheless be mistaken as to their ability to 
'change their mind ' at a later stage and withdraw their consent. It would be 
helpful to have this information provided and explained to them as part of the 
consent process. 
C Timing of consents 
The purpose of the 10-day statutory limit before a mother 's consent can be given 
is to allow her time to recover from the trauma of childbirth and the significant 
physical and emotional changes that accompany it. 41 It is important that the 
decision to consent be made at a time when the mother possesses the ability to 
think critically and act rationally in order to make the best choice for her baby 's 
lifetime. 
It is arguable however, that the 10-day period fails to achieve this desired 
purpose - whether a woman can fully recover from such a physically traumatic, 
emotionally hyped , life-changing event in ten days is certainly open to challenge. 
36 Robert Ludbrook "Adoption Consents: Negotiating the Sliding Doors" ( 1998) 2 BFLJ 320,32 1 
(Ludbrook "Sliding Doors"). 
37 In the matter of A (adoption) [ 1998] NZFLR 964 (Fam). 
38 In the matter of A (adoption), see above n37 , 968. 
39 In the matter of A (adoption), see above n37 , 969. 
40 Ludbrook "Sliding Doors", see above n36, 321. 
41 M v Department of Social Welfare (1983) FLN 80 (2d) at N 1219 as summarised in Griffiths 
New Zealand Adoption, above 1127, 57. 
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Indeed, the 1954 Departmental Committee recommended that the time limit be 6 
weeks (as it is in Britain). This was reduced to 4 weeks in the 1955 Draft Bill, 
and dropped further to 10 days by the Statutes Revision Committee. 42 
The 10 day requirement appears to simply be an arbitrary date fixed as a 
compromise between the need for a mother's recovery from childbirth on one 
hand, and on the other hand the desire to have the adoption process begun 
quickly to prevent difficulties if mothers disappeared from nursing homes,43 and 
to enable bonding between the child and the new adoptive parents.44 
D Consent withdrawal 
The practical application of section 9 has been dependent on the answers given to 
the questions "When is consent 'given'?", "When is an application 'pending'?", 
and "What is a 'reasonable' opportunity?". 
1 When is consent 'given'? 
The Court of Appeal in In the Adoption of G 45 has held that a consent is given 
for the purposes of section 9 when the document signifying it is filed in the Court 
or handed to the other party and has not "become inoperative by earlier 
notification that the consent is withdrawn".46 The signing of the formal document 
without more does not amount to the giving of consent,47 but the original 
document need not be forwarded to the intending adoptive parents or filed in the 
court for the consent to become operative - a copy is sufficient.48 
There is conflict however between the In the Adoption of G view and that 
expounded by Judge Inglis QC in In the matter of A ( adoption). In the latter 
case, the judge's view that once the document is given to him or her, the 
witnessing solicitor holds it on behalf of the intending adoptive parents leads to 
42 Griffith , New Zealand Adoption, see above n27, 57. 
43 (26 October 1955) 307 NZPD 3349 , Hon Mr Marshall. 
44 Griffith, New Zealand Adoption, see above n27 , 57. 
-1s In the Adoption of C (1982) I NZFLR l54 (CA). 
46 In the Adoption of C, see above n45 , l56. 
47 In In the Adoption of C, sec above n45 , 157, the Court approved of its tentative answer to the 
question posed in K v L [ 1973] I NZLR 50 (although it was not directly at issue in that case). 
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the conclusion that the consent becomes irrevocable once it is given to the 
solicitor (because the mother is effectively giving the document to the intending 
adoptive parents).49 
If the In the matter of A ( adoption) view was followed in In the Adoption of G, 
then the mother could not have effectively withdrawn her consent when she 
notified the intending adoptive parents of its revocation before the document 
arrived by post from the solicitor. 
The distinction appears to have been made on the basis that in In the Adoption of 
G the solicitor was the mother's solicitor under a continuing solicitor-client 
relationship, but this was not the case in In the matter of A ( adoption). However, 
such a distinction would be impractical to uphold, as it would no doubt lead to 
much argument to determine the requirements needed to ascertain whether in fact 
a solicitor-client relationship exists. It is obvious that confusion still exists in the 
current law and that such confusion is unsatisfactory. 
2 When is an application 'pending'? 
An early view was that an application ceased to be 'pending' when it was 
"lodged in the Court supported by the necessary consents and affidavits by the 
applicants". 50 This resulted in the odd situation that the consent was irrevocable 
until the application was filed, but then became revocable again at this time. 
In 1969 the view was expressed that pending meant 'awaiting decision' because: 
"No useful purpose would be served by making the mother's consent irrevocable only 
up to the time of the filing of the application but revocable thereafter and in fact it would 
bring about a cruel state of affairs that the adopting parents, having made their final 
decision and filed their application, should then have their hopes dashed."
51 
48 B v M (1998) 17 FRNZ 289,299 (HC). 
49 In the matter of A ( adoption) ,see above n37, 969. 
50 Re K ( 1966) l l MCD 468, 470. 
51 A v B [ 1969) NZLR 534,536 (SC). 
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An application will no longer be pending if the reasonable opportunity to lodge it 
has expired, where one of the applicants dies or the applicants become estranged. 
Fresh consents are required in these situations. 52 
3 What is a 'reasonable' opportunity? 
Reasonableness is a fluid concept used in all areas of the law. What is 
reasonable will usually be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
In the case of an application for adoption the reasonable time will have lapsed if 
the reasons for the delay are such that they show that the adopting parents have 
truly lost interest in the adoption. 53 No specific time limit can be set down as 
'reasonable', as what has been considered reasonable in one case has been 
considered unreasonable in another. 54 
E Dispensing with Consent 
1 Grounds for dispensing with consent 
There are several grounds for dispensing with consent to an adoption. These will 
be discussed individually. 
(a) Abandoning the child 
"Abandonment connotes a deliberate action on the part of the parent: a turning of 
the back on the child and a physical separation."55 
It is a criminal offence to abandon a child under 6 years (section 154 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 ), but abandonment to a degree that would make a parent 
criminally liable is not needed in order to satisfy the abandonment ground in the 
d · 56 a option context. 
52 
See for example: H v D [ 197 4] 2 NZLR 481, 485 (SC); Re an application by D ( 1984) 3 
NZFLR 434 (Fam). 
53 Re Adoption A9!87 ( 1987) 3 FRNZ 457, 460 (Fam). 
54 
Compare Re Adoption A9!87 ( 1987) 3 FRNZ 457 (Fam) with Re Adoption A35!86 ( 1986) 3 
FRNZ 477 (Fam). 
55 Trapski, see above n33 , para E23 (updated 24 October 1997). 
56 Trapski, see above n33 , para E23 (updated 24 October 1997). 
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(b) Neglect of the child 
"Neglect denotes a careless indifference to the child's needs, whether those needs are 
physical, social, educational or emotional. A parent who fails to give a minimum 
acceptable standard of care and attention to the child can be said to have neglected the 
child."57 
Again, there is the possibility of criminal prosecution for neglect of a child, but 
in an adoption case the courts do not apply the same standard. 58 The seriousness 
of the neglect will nevertheless be an important factor to take into account. 
(c) Persistent failure to maintain the child 
Failure to maintain a child is a breach of parental duty (and statutory 
requirements contained in statutes such as the Crimes Act 1961 and the Child 
Support Act 1991). 
However, failure to fully meet required maintenance payments of itself will not 
conclusively satisfy this ground. 59 The Court must examine the parent's ability to 
pay the amounts, and whether the failure to pay could be considered 
'persistent' .60 This is necessarily decided on a case-by-case basis. 
(d) Persistent ill treatment of the child 
One isolated incident, even if serious, would probably not suffice for this ground 
to be satisfied. The ill treatment must continue over time. 61 
Whether treatment is 'ill treatment' will be determined in accordance with the 
facts of the case, bearing in mind that although the Crimes Act permits 
reasonable corporal punishment, wilful ill treatment of a child is a criminal 
offence. A lower standard of ill treatment will be needed to meet the ground in 
section 8 than is needed in respect of criminal proceedings. 
57 Trapski, sec above n33, para E23 (updated 24 October 1997). 
58 E v M (1980) NZRL 9. 
59 Griffiths New Zealand Adoption, see above n27, 70. 
60 Trapski, see above n33, para E24 (updated 24 October l 997). 
61 Discussion of the need to show that the child 'is being' ill-treated requiring more than one 
incident is contained in DSW v T and O ( 1983) l FRNZ 8, 21 (HC). 
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(e) Failure to exercise the normal duty and care of parenthood 
Whether a parent has fulfilled this criteria will again be determined on the 
particular facts. But the most basic requirements of parenthood are "the 
provision of shelter, clothing, food together with love and affection".62 
(f) Unfit to have care of the child 
Where the parent lacks the capacity to recognise and fulfil the child ' s needs 
consent may be dispensed with as long as this unfitness is likely to continue 
indefinitely. 63 
All of the above grounds envisage a situation where parents have acted in a way 
towards their child so as to lessen the Court's concern for protection of their 
parental rights in the consent process. That is, "the parents have by their 
behaviour shown such a lack of concern for the child as to have forfeited their 
claim to consideration in a matter affecting its future welfare."64 
The Interdepartmental Working Party expressed satisfaction with the current 
grounds but recommended that they be extended to include some other 
situations. 65 
V REFORM 
A Who Can Consent? 
The protection of a birth mother's right in the consent process is maintained by 
requiring her consent to the adoption of her child in almost all cases (unless there 
is another adoption order in force or her consent has been dispensed with). In 
contrast, the rights of others involved in the process perhaps require greater 
recognition in new legislation - especially the rights of the birth fathers of ex-
nuptial children , birthparent families/whanau and the proposed adoptee. 
62 E v M, above n 58. 
63 W v D ( adoption) ( 1992) 9 FRNZ 402, 413 (Fam). 
64 Webb Report, see above n26, 50. 
65 Review of Adoption Act 1955 by an interdepartmental Working Party: Proposals f or discussion 
January 1987, para 4.38 (Working Party Report). 
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I Birthfather 
Currently, the consent of the father of an ex-nuptial child is not required unless 
the Court considers that it is expedient to do so. 
The presumption therefore, is that the putative father's consent will not be 
required unless he has been declared the father by the Court or contributed 
maintenance to the child or he has taken an active interest in the child and 
acknowledged his paternal responsibilities. These criteria are in line with the 
rationale behind the current consent regime - it is designed to protect parental 
rights. Where no parental rights have been asserted (and no parental duties 
undertaken) then involvement in the consent process is deemed inappropriate. 
Nevertheless, there are situations where a father's lack of acceptance of parental 
rights and responsibilities is due to factors beyond his control , or to the lack of 
communication between him and the birth mother, not due to a lack of care or 
concern for the child. 
It is important that these fathers are not forever denied a legal relationship with 
their child through adoption, without their knowledge of (let alone consent to) 
the process. 
Biological links, cultural heritage and whakapapa are important to help a child to 
gain a sense of identity and understand where they come from. It is submitted 
that preference should, where possible, be given to an arrangement that maintains 
these family links , and a birth father should be given the opportunity to care for 
the child if the mother is unable or unwilling to. 
Arguably, the presumption in relation to birth father consents should be reversed 
- to require his consent, or at the very least require notice of the proposed 
adoption to be given, in all cases, unless special circumstances exist. 
Such special circumstances could include cases where conception resulted from 
rape or incest, or where the involvement of the father would endanger the mother 
and/or child, as well as the current grounds for dispensing with consent. All 
decisions should be made in the best interests of the child. 
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The requirement of either birth father consent or notice would be advantageous 
to the child, as the birthfather, or a couple within his extended family may 
provide a suitable intra-family option for the care of the child. 
There are however some disadvantages with such a legislative regime. Firstly, 
significant time and resources may have to be spent attempting to locate 
wayward birth fathers. 
This factor could perhaps be countered by a requirement that only a ' reasonable 
effort' or ' reasonable inquiry' be made by the agency arranging the adoption to 
locate a father. Such provisions would be legislatively defined and be akin to 
those recommended by the Western Australia Adoption Legislative Review 
Committee in 1990.66 Admittedly, the effectiveness of such enquiries would be 
greatly dependent on the assistance of the birth-mother in providing as many 
details as possible about the child's birth father - this dependency could result in 
fruitless and futile searches where animosity exists between the parents and the 
birth mother is not cooperative. 
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission said this about a similar 
proposal: 67 
"This enables a balance to be struck between the right of birthfathers to be in formed 
about the existence of their children and to participate in their lives; the ability and 
resources of the agencies to conduct searching processes; and the interests of the adoptee 
in not having a beneficial placement unduly delayed by lengthy searches for a birth 
father." 
Secondly, where a hostile relationship exists between the birth parents, the birth 
father may maliciously withhold consent to the adoption simply to cause anguish 
for the birth mother. 
In these cases provision could be made to dispense with the consent of a non-
custodial father where he was withholding it unreasonably and was not able to 
66 Western Australia Adoption Legislative Review Committee Draft Report: A new approach to 
adoption Perth , March 1990, Recommendation 65, 129 (Western Australian Review Committee 
Report). 
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provide satisfactory alternative care arrangements for the child. The Adoption 
Act 1976 (UK), Section 16(2)(b) provides for dispensing with parental consent if 
it is being withheld unreasonably. 
2 Birth parent families/whanau 
The question has been raised as to whether more involvement of birth parent 
families should be provided for in the adoption process. 68 This issue has been 
particularly addressed in relation to the interface between the Adoption Act 1955 
- a 'mother empowering Act' - and the Children, Young Persons and their 
Families Act 1989 - a 'whanau empowering Act' - in social work practice. 69 
"The rules as to consent to adoption and dispensation of consent reflect a 
perception of the family as a nuclear unit with virtually absolute power and 
authority resting in the biological parent or parents."70 
The Review Committee did not favour mandatory involvement of birth parent 
families but recommended that the birth mother should be counselled as to the 
merits of including the family in her deliberations prior to making the decision to 
consent. 71 
Birth parents should always be encouraged to look to their families for support 
and possible alternative care arrangements for the child, but even given the fact 
that adoption will legally sever the links with the family as well, their wishes 
should not detract from the autonomy of the birth parents to make decisions 
regarding their child's future. 
Accordingly, there should be no legal requirement for family consent or 
involvement in the decision to consent, but with the increasing predominance of 
open adoptions the Joss of a family member through adoption could possibly be 
67 New South Wales Law Reform Commission Report 81: Review of the Adoption of Children 
Act J965(NSW) , Sydney, March 1997, para 5.113,173 (NSW Law Reform Commission Report). 68 Adoption Practices Review Committee Report to the Minister of Social Welfare August 1990, 
45 (Review Committee Report); Ludbrook "Sliding doors" , see above n36, 322. 69 Review Committee Report, see above n68, 44. 
70 Trapski, see above 1133, para E2 (updated 20 November 1998). 
71 Review Committee Report , see above 1168, Recommendation 8,6. 
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mitigated by notice of the adoption and encouragement of participation in 
continuing access agreements between birth families and adoptive families -
subject to the wishes of the birth parent. 
3 Potential adoptee 
Under New Zealand's current law, the wishes of the child are considered in 
determining whether the adoption will promote the adoptee's welfare (section 11 
(b)). 
This is done by way of a social worker or Maori community officer's report or 
by the appointment by the Court of counsel to call evidence and address 
arguments from the adoptee's point of view. There is however no provision for 
the adoptee's consent to the adoption, regardless of his or her capacity to make 
rational decisions regarding his or her future and best interests. 
In Western Australia, if the child is 12 years of age or older he or she must 
consent to the adoption.72 A similar provision exists in South Australia's 
Adoption Act 1988.73 In some other countries the consent of even younger 
children is legally required.74 
It is submitted that proposed adoptees who have the capacity to comprehend the 
issues should have greater involvement in the adoption process. The child 
should be counselled separately as to the effect of an adoption order and greater 
provision should be made for their wishes to be taken account of (as is required 
by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989). 
This could be achieved either by requiring an older child's consent to their 
adoption, or by providing them with a right to veto the adoption. 75 However, 
provision would still need to be made to cater for those cases where the potential 
72 Adoption Act 1994 (WA) sl7(1)(c )(ii). 
73 Section 16. 
74 Trapski, see above n33 , para E2 (updated 20 November 1998) - examples given include 
Croatia ( I 0) and Mongolia (9). 
75 R Hodgkin and P Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1998) Geneva, UNICEF, 274 as discussed in Trapski , see above n33 , para E2 (updated 20 
November 1998). 
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adoptee could not in fact make a rational decision with regard to the issues 
involved. The Court should be permitted to dispense with the child's consent in 
such a situation. 
Teenagers require some control over their lives. At a time when they are 
struggling to find their own identity it is important that they not be forced to take 
on a new one against their wishes. 
B Manner of consents 
Currently there are sparse procedural requirements before consent can legally 
take place - the witness must explain the legal effects of the adoption order and 
signify that he or she believes that the consenter has understood those effects. 
It is submitted, that in order to guard against confusion and uncertainty, further 
steps should be required to be taken before an effective consent can be given. 
1 Provision of counselling and information 
"The number of birth mothers who regret their decision to consent to the adoption of 
their baby, and the number of times the Courts have had to decide whether a written 
consent is a genuine exercise of the birth mother's free choice, indicates that the present 
law does not always adequately protect birth mothers."
76 
It is suggested that the provision of counselling would lessen the likelihood of a 
mother reconsidering her decision. 
Other jurisdictions have such regimes. The Western Australia Adoption Act 1994 
contains a mandatory requirement for the provision of information and also for 
counselling if requested. Consents are not valid until 28 days after the provision 
of such information and/or counselling.77 Similarly the Victorian Adoption Act 
1984 requires that written information about the effect of an adoption order, the 
alternatives to adoption, and the names and addresses of organisations that 
provide family support services, must be given 7 days before the consent. 78 
76 Trapski , see above n33, para E8 (updated 28 May 1999). 
77 Adoption Act 1994 (WA) s 18( I )(b ). 
78 Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) s35(l)(b). 
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Counselling is also mandatory. 79 In South Australia the parent must be 
counselled at least 3 days before the consent is given .80 
Although the apparent practice in New Zealand is to supply the mother with 
more than is legally required in terms of the Act,81 it is submitted that to make 
the provision of counselling a legal requirement would ensure that the benefit of 
such practice extended uniformly to all birth parents . 
The birth parents should be provided with written information as to the 
alternatives to adoption and organisations that could provide support (emotional , 
practical and financial) depending on which alternative was chosen . This 
information should be provided well before the consent is given to allow the 
birth parent to give full consideration to it. The written information should be 
followed up with counselling, to provide an opportunity to ask questions and to 
ensure that the birth parent really does understand the full implications of each 
alternative. 
Counsellors would need to be sure that the birth mother had sufficiently 
recovered from the birth and was not suffering from post-natal depression or 
other such conditions which could effect her ability to make a rational and 
considered decision. As suggested by the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, an assessment of the mothers overall physical , emotional and 
psychological fitness should be made part of the consent process. 82 
2 Alteration of consentfonn 
It is submitted that the consent form signed by birth parents should contain more 
information than is currently supplied. Aside from the current provisions it 
should also contain: 
• The effect of the document of consent itself; 
79 Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) s35(1)(a). 
80 Adoption Act 1988 (SA) s 15(5)(c ). 
81 Review Committee Report, see above 1168 , 24. 
82 NSW Law Reform Commission Report, see above 1167, para 5.45 , 151. 
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• Clear instructions as to the procedures required to be followed in order to 
withdraw the consent; 
• The date on which the consent becomes irrevocable; 
• Clear explanation of the effect of continuing access arrangements 
pursuant to an 'open' adoption; 
• The effect that the Adult Adoption Information Act may have at a later 
point in time (and any relevant procedures under this Act). 
A solicitor, as witness to the consent, should explain the legal effects and be 
satisfied that the consenter understands all these provisions before the document 
is signed. 
The intended effect of these additions to the consent forms is to ensure that the 
birth parents know the legal implications of their consent and the status of the 
legal assumptions on which that consent may be based. This will also hopefully 
reduce the number of cases before the Courts in which parents have tried 
unsuccessfully to withdraw their consent because they were unsure of the way to 
go about doing it. 
3 Rem.oval of the religious condition, addition of a 'Statement of Requests ' 
The specific recognition of religion in the Act had long been recognised as an 
anomaly and should be removed. 83 Instead a 'Statement of Requests' (s imilar to 
New South Wales84) should be introduced and could be annexed to a Form No3 
consent (consent to adoption by non-identified parties). 
The Statement of Requests could include any particulars the birth parent wished 
to be present in his or her child's adoptive parents, but would not act as 
conditions to prevent the adoption if unfulfilled - they would merely act as 
guidelines for the agency concerned to consider when choosing applicants for the 
adoption of the child. 
83 Webb report, see above n26, 45-46. 
84 Adoption of Children Regulation 1995 (NSW) Schedule l , Form 4. 
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If a parent had any particular conditions that they adamantly wanted to be . 
adhered to, they could ensure this themselves by selecting the adoptive parents 
from the profiles of applicants provided to the Department of Social Welfare. 
There is no need to create legislative protection of birth parent recommendations , 
as it is now quite common for birth parents to be involved in the selection 
process and, with the continuing predominance of open adoption, many actually 
meet the proposed adopters before the birth of the child. 
4 Clarification of the role of witnesses 
A counsellor should attest to the mental, physical and emotional fitness of the 
consent giver on a form annexed to the consent document. A solicitor should 
witness the consent of each of the consent givers separately. 
Whether a solicitor-client relationship is created between the consent giver and 
the consent taker will be less fundamental with clearer withdrawal procedures, 
however the nature of the relationship should be spelt out to avoid any 
unnecessary confusion and litigation. 
The solicitor would be merely performing a statutory function and hold the 
document on behalf of the intending adoptive parents. But in contrast to the 
current situation, the consent would still be able to be withdrawn once it was 
given to the solicitor as long as it was done within the revocation period (see Part 
V C and Part VD). 
C Timing of consents 
The trend in other jurisdictions has been towards either a longer period before 
consent is admissible or a short time followed by a period during which the 
consent can be withdrawn. These have been to allow the mother to adjust to the 
situation after the child's birth and be certain of her decision. 
The Interdepartmental Working Party recommended that New Zealand either 
extend the period of consent to 28 days, or allow consent to be given after 10 
28 
days but with a further 21 day 'revocable period'. 85 The latter option was the 
most favoured by the Committee. 86 
Whilst having a long consent period would ensure that the mother had recovered 
from the birth, it may also be too long and agonising for those mothers who are 
able to be certain in their decision after a short time. 
It is submitted that having a 'revocable period' regime is a more flexible option 
that seems to best balance the competing interests of those involved. 
Firstly, mothers who wish to make a decision quickly are able to begin the 
process early, but others who may make the choice at 10 days and then find that 
the change their mind after they have fully recovered from the birth are able to 
withdraw their consent within a set period. Such reconsideration is preferable to 
a hurried decision that may be forever regretted. 
Secondly, children can be placed with the adoptive parents early to facilitate 
bonding. The separation from her child can also be beneficial for a birth mother 
to experience the reality of her decision whilst she still has a chance to change 
her mind. 
Research shows that it is in the best interests of the child to be placed with the 
adoptive parents within 2 months of birth .87 Even with the revocation period the 
child will certainly be with the adoptive parents within this time and the consent 
will not be able to be withdrawn. 
Arguments that highlight the fact that the period of uncertainty faced by adoptive 
parents during the revokable period would put pressure on their relationship with 
the child can be countered in various ways . 
Firstly, it would surely be preferable to have 21 days of uncertainty rather than 
spend a much longer period of time battling the issue in the Court if a 
birthmother purports to revoke her consent or challenge its validity. It is hoped 
85 Working Party Report, see above 1165 , para 4 . l. 
86 Working Party Report , see above n65, para 4. l. 
87 Western Australian Review Committee Report, see above 1166, para 4 .16. 
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that the extension of time available to consider the decision , coupled with the 
provision of counselling and adequate information (as discussed in Part V B 1 ), 
will decrease the number of birthmothers who regret their decision - and so 
increase the certainty of the adoption process overall. 
Secondly, if the adoptive parents did not wish to care for the child until the 
revocation period had expired (for fear of growing too attached to the child only 
to have him or her taken away again) then temporary care could be arranged for 
the interim period. 
Adoptive parents should be encouraged to visit the child and to experience the 
reality of being a parent. Birth parents should be encouraged to visit to create 
memories of their child, to experience the impact of separation and to 'say 
goodbye '. 
With the increasing advent of open adoption arrangements it is important for 
both sets of parents to be sure about the decision so that no resentment or 
hostility exists between them. Trust and cooperation are essential to making the 
open adoption work, especially given the general unenforceability of continuing 
access arrangements. 
D Consent Withdrawal 
The confusing and technical nature of this area has been highlighted in 
Ludbrook's examination of two cases (H v S88 and B v M89) in his article 
"Adoption Consents: Negotiating the Sliding Doors". 90 It is evident that urgent 
reform is needed to reinstate some measure of certainty into the withdrawal 
procedure. 
The provision of adequate information and counselling, and a longer period 
available for consideration of the decision should reduce the likelihood of a 
mother regretting her decision and increase her ability to make a supported and 
informed choice. 
88 H v S, unreported , Thames Family Court, 4 July 1996, Judge Brown. 
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Undoubtedly there would still be situations where the mother was coerced into 
making the decision, or for some other reason changed her mind. The 
' revocation period' is designed to be used in these situations to lessen the need 
for lengthy recourse to the Courts. 
Alterations to the consent form (as discussed in Part VB 2) would give greater 
clarity to the procedure for withdrawal. The procedure could be set out clearly, 
and the definitions of any possibly ambiguous terms could be statutorily defined. 
This would be preferable to the current regime of judicial definition (as is 
evidenced by the confusion still surrounding the meanings of 'given' and 
'pending' in this context). 
With all the requirements being set out on a form, explained to the mother, and 
signed by her, there will be considerably less scope to challenge the validity of 
consent. The effectiveness of any purported withdrawal will also be more readily 
ascertained. 
E Dispensing with Consent 
The expanded grounds for dispensation recommended by the Working Party 
were: 91 
(a) The parent has abandoned, neglected, or persistently ill-treated the 
child. 
This is simply a restatement of some of the existing grounds in Section 8(1 )(a). 
(b) The parent, by failing without reasonable cause to exercise the 
normal duty and care of parenthood, has allowed the child to form 
ties with the prospective adopters which it would be to the child's 
significant detriment to break and adoption is the only satisfactory 
way to ensure their continuance. 
89 B v M ( adoption) 1998 17 FRNZ 289 (HC). 
90 (1998) 2 BFLJ 320. 
91 Working Party Report, see above n65 , para 4.4. 
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(c) i) The parent has failed without reasonable cause to exercise the 
normal duty and care of parenthood with the result that the 
child has not formed ties with the parent; and 
ii) The child has not formed ties with any prospective adoptive 
parents; and 
iii) Adoption is the only satisfactory way to ensure that the child 
has an opportunity to form ties with parents. 
These grounds also encompass elements of the 'failure to maintain' and 'failure 
to exercise the normal duty and care of parenthood' criteria in Section 8( 1 )(a) but 
allow for an examination into the reasons for the failure through the 'without 
reasonable cause' enquiry. 
They also recognise that it is "generally detrimental to the security or stability of 
a child to disturb a settled or partially developed relationship of this kind." 92 
However there is still a residual discretion for the Court to determine whether 
adoption is the only way to protect those relationships. Presumably this 
requirement would be made with the best interests of the child in mind. 
(d) The parent is unfit by reason of physical or mental incapacity to have 
the care of the child, the unfitness is likely to continue indefinitely, 
and adoption is the only satisfactory way to protect the chi Id 's 
interests. 
This ground is simply a rephrasing of the current Section 8(l )(b) of the 1955 Act. 
The general rationale behind the operation of this regime would be that: 
"Dispensation with parental consent to allow an adoption to proceed should be 
permitted only when adoption is absolutely necessary to protect or encourage a 
I d I ' h' II 93 sett e re at1ons 1p. 
92 Working Party Report, sec above n65 , para 4.41. 
93 Working Party Report, sec above n65 , para 4.43. 
32 
VI SUMMARY OF PROPOSED REFORMS 
• Birth parents should, where possible, be encouraged to include their families 
in the decision making process but this should not be a mandatory 
requirement. The birth parents wishes should be respected in this matter. 
• All birth fathers should be required to consent to the adoption of their child 
unless the conception was a result of rape or incest; or the involvement of the 
father would be a danger to the mother and/or child; or the father could not 
be located after a 'reasonable enquiry'; or the father's consent is dispensed 
with in accordance with the Act. 
• 'Reasonable enquiry' should be legislatively defined. 
• Birth parents should be given written information concerning the alternative 
options for the future care of their child, including details of organisations 
and people who could provide support. 
• The written information should be explored with a counsellor, who should 
also explain the documented emotional and psychological effects of the 
adoption and support the birth parents in making their decision . 
• Both a counsellor and a solicitor should witness the consent documents of 
both parents separately. 
• The counsellor should attest to the mental, emotional and physical fitness of 
the birth parents (particularly the mother) at the time they sign the consent 
document. 
• A solicitor should explain the legal effects of the adoption order, the status of 
the consent document and the procedure and time limits for withdrawing 
consent. 
• The solicitor's witnessing of the consent would not create a solicitor-client 
relationship. 
• The consent form should contain the date at which the revocation period 
expires and a detailed explanation of the withdrawal procedure. 
• The consent form should contain information about the effect of the Adult 
Adoption Information Act 1985 and the enforceability of continuing access 
agreements. 
• The consent should not be given by the mother until 10 clear days after the 
birth of the baby and should be able to be withdrawn for a 21 day period after 
it is given. 
• The withdrawal procedure and any ambiguous words should be legislatively 
defined. 
• The religious condition should be removed and replaced with a 'Statement of 
Requests' form to be annexed to a Form No3 consent. This 'Statement of 
Requests' would not make the adoption ineffective if not complied with but 
would rather be a guide for the authorities in selecting suitable adoptive 
parents. 
• Birth parents should continue to be encouraged to take an active part in the 
selection of adoptive parents for their child and Form No2 consents should be 
favoured as more conducive to an open adoption arrangement. 
• Dispensation of parental consent should only occur when the parent has 
shown such a lack of concern for the child as to forfeit any claim to have his 
or her parental rights considered through the consent process and when 
adoption is the only satisfactory means of protecting the child's best interests. 
The Court should also have the discretion to dispense with the consent of a 
non-custodial birth father if it is unreasonably withheld against the child's 
best interests. 
• Preference should firstly be given to alternatives to stranger adoption - such 
as guardianship or intra-family care arrangements - to preserve the important 
biological and cultural links that exist between a child and his or her family . 
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VII CONCLUSION 
For decades now there have been calls from all areas of the adoption arena for a 
change in the adoption legislation. So far, despite the commissioning of various 
committees and workgroups to examine the law, Parliament has been slow to act 
and there have been few significant changes to the 1955 Act. 
However, in early 1999 the Minister of Justice instructed the Law Commission to 
conduct a thorough review of the existing law. Perhaps this time the proposals 
will be accepted and the long awaited reforms realised. It is certain that until 
changes are made to the procedure for giving, withdrawing, and dispensing with 
consents, uncertainty and confusion will prevail, causing inconvenience and 
heartache to many. 
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